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Abstract 
The need to construct an effective strategy for industrial development in low-income 
countries has been largely ignored by development economists because industrial 
policies have failed in many developing countries.  This does not imply, however, that 
industrial development cannot be promoted.  This paper attempts to synthesize the 
conventional wisdom in development economics with recent advancements in various 
fields of economics (such as theories of endogenous growth and agglomeration 
economies) to provide a useful framework to design a strategy for industrial 
development, which consists of investments in managerial human capital followed by 
the provision of credit and the construction of industrial zones.    
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A Cluster-Based Industrial Development Policy for 
Low-Income Countries 
Keijiro Otsuka 
Tetsushi Sonobe 
 
I.  Introduction 
The last four decades have witnessed a large number of successful cases of 
industrial development in Asia but possibly an equally large number of failures in other 
developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  While the 
governments of developing countries have been eager to realize industrial development 
for the last several decades, development economists have not made serious attempts to 
design strategies to develop industries.2  Probably this is due partly to the failure of 
import substitution policy and partly to the commonly accepted neoclassical 
presumption that “industrial policy” does not work, and thus governments have to do 
little to promote industrial development beyond the provision of infrastructure such as 
roads, electricity, and communication systems.   
Such a presumption, however, is incorrect to the extent that the government is 
able to address major market failures better than any private or non-market institutions 
or to support such institutions’ corrective functions without causing a serious 
government failure.  A major market failure arises from high transaction costs between 
manufacturing firms (e.g., assemblers and parts-suppliers) and between manufacturers 
and traders, particularly in developing countries, which are attributed to asymmetric 
                                                  
2 There are, however, exceptions; e.g., Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2009), Lin and Monga (2010, 
2011), and Page (2011).  
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information and imperfect contract enforcement (e.g., Akerlof 1970; Williamson 1985; 
Hart and Moore 1990).  An obvious institution counteracting this problem is industrial 
clusters, in which the transacting parties are located near each other to reduce 
transaction costs (Becker and Murphy 1992).   
Industrial clusters are not a panacea, however.  Its favorable effects are lessened 
by market failures other than transaction costs.  First of all, the inadequacy of 
managerial human resources of firms in developing countries has been increasingly 
recognized in the recent literature (e.g., Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2010).  The case 
studies of industrial development in Asia and Africa by Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, 
2011) reveal that entrepreneurs’ managerial human capital plays a critical role in 
industrial development, as it affects improvements in production and management 
efficiency.  More recent waves of randomized experiments demonstrate that the 
majority of entrepreneurs in developing countries have inadequate knowledge about 
standard management practices (e.g., Bloom et al. 2010).  As with ordinary human 
capital, investment in managerial human capital is likely to be socially sub-optimal due 
importantly to inaccessibility to finance.  By analogy to Arrow’s argument (1962), we 
expect that this problem is exacerbated by information spillovers, which thwart the 
incentive for a head start in learning more about management.  We argue that the 
government can help non-market private institutions facilitate managerial human capital 
accumulation and even assist in the emergence of a market for management knowledge.  
Secondly, there is much evidence, based on randomized controlled and natural 
experiments (e.g., De Mel et al. 2008; Banajee and Duflo 2005), that small and medium 
firms in low-income countries are faced with severe credit constraints.  It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that a policy toward industrial development should begin 
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with correcting this market failure problem.  We argue that the provision of 
low-interest loans to credit-constrained firms is more effective if it is implemented after 
the provision of technical and managerial training for them.   
The purpose of this article is to formulate an effective industrial development 
policy for low-income countries based on both the traditional and recent literature in 
development economics and related fields. Our presumption is that industrial 
development is successful only when it conforms to the changing pattern of 
comparative advantage from labor-intensive to capital-intensive and further to 
knowledge-intensive industries (Akamatsu 1962; Vernon 1966; Lin 2009).  We believe 
that the engine of such development is technological progress including both innovation 
accompanied by the process of constructive destruction and less drastic but practically 
important improvements in production and management (e.g., Schumpeter 1912; Solow 
1956; Romer 1986; Grossman and Helpman 1991).  We agree with Gerschenkron 
(1962) and Deming (1994), among many others, that the major source of technological 
progress is the application of the appropriate knowledge of technology and management 
imported from developed countries to productive activities.3 
This paper is concerned with the development of industries in low-income 
economies.  In these economies, the application of imported knowledge to production 
and management is new and accordingly difficult for most enterprises, and 
improvements in production and management that seem simple to developed country 
enterprises often contribute substantially to productivity gains.  This paper, therefore, 
                                                  
3 By now, this view has been widely accepted by development economists and other experts.  
Indeed, Japanese development since the Meiji era provides a vivid example of rapid economic 
development based on technology imports (e.g., Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973; Otsuka, Ranis, and 
Saxonhouse 1988; Hamada et al. 2011).  In their textbook on development economics, Hayami and 
Godo (2005) argue that successful technology transfer from developed to less developed economies 
is the key to the successful development of the latter.    
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uses the term “improvement in production and management” (IPM) to describe the 
result of the application of such knowledge with the connotation of innovation.  In 
Section II, we begin by discussing how to promote the initiation of new appropriate 
industries, which is followed by the discussion of how to sustain the industrial 
development with a view to stimulating IPM in their subsequent development stages in 
Sections III and IV.  In Section V, we consider the possibility of government failures 
which may defy the proposed strategy.  Section VI concludes the paper by 
recapitulating the proposed industrial development policy. 
 
II. Promotion of New Industries 
There is no question that successful industrial development must follow the 
changing pattern of comparative advantages.  In order to ensure such a development 
path, competitive market environments must be created and maintained by the 
government so that the scarcity of resources and the social value of goods are signaled 
by market prices.  This is not enough, however, to initiate the industrialization; the 
initiation of a new industry is an innovative activity and, as Schumpeter (1912) clearly 
points out, innovation is likely to be imitated by followers, which tends to depress the 
incentives to innovate.  One possible solution is to rely on the leadership of the 
government in the selection and promotion of appropriate industries.  Recently Lin 
(2010) and Lin and Monga (2010, 2011) have proposed that the government in 
low-income countries should identify and promote industries which have successfully 
developed and become mature in slightly more advanced countries with similar factor 
endowments.  While we agree with these authors that it will be a sound development 
strategy to imitate slightly more advanced countries, we admit that there is the risk of 
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government failure associated with the choice of industries, as is argued by Pack and 
Saggi (2006), and the ways in which support is provided.4  In this paper, we propose an 
“entrepreneur-led and government-assisted” approach to the establishment of new 
industries based on our own observation that there are a significant number of 
potentially competent entrepreneurs in low-income countries.  Our approach is 
consistent with the theoretical proposition of Rodriguez-Clare (2007) that the best 
policy entails the direct promotion of clustering in the sector in which the country has a 
comparative advantage.    
A View from Case Studies 
Our argument is based importantly on our 19 case studies of cluster-based 
industrial development in Asia and Africa, which are listed in Table 1.  All these 
clusters have been voluntarily formed by private firms, including the four cases in 
China, without much assistance from the government.  Thus, these studies in China are 
comparable to the other case studies.  The studies of four industrial clusters in Japan 
and Taiwan, China are also comparable because they were developed before these 
countries became highly industrialized.  Table 2 reports the major characteristics of 
these clusters in terms of the number of firms, average size of employment, the average 
schooling years of entrepreneurs, and whether their products were exported.  Although 
the average employment size tends to be small in industrial clusters in SSA (cases 8-10, 
15-17, and 19), the number of firms is large compared with clusters in Asia.  As will be 
discussed in the next section in more detail, the majority of the private firms in 
developing countries are located in industrial clusters, which we define as the 
                                                  
4 A case in point is the failure of the import substitution industrial policy, which provided distorted 
profit incentives to enterprises (Bhagwati 1978; Krueger 1978; Balassa et al. 1982).  Lin and 
Monga (2011) propose the simplified industrialization strategy to avoid such failures. 
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localization of firms producing similar and related products (e.g., final products and 
parts).  At least in the early stage of development, firms in these clusters were small 
family firms which employed a small number of workers.   
Consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, the initial products of these 
clusters, as shown in the parentheses in the last column, tended to be labor-intensive 
items.  This tendency is clearer in the first group (i.e., cases 1 to 10) than in the second 
group (cases 11 to 17) and the third group (cases 18 and 19).  The clusters in the first 
group were initiated by pioneering entrepreneurs who produced imitations of imported 
goods through reverse engineering without any help from the government or foreign 
firms.  The development of the second group of clusters was based on foreign 
technologies brought by foreign direct investments (FDIs), state-owned firms (SOEs), 
or foreign artisans who migrated from Southern Europe and ran home-based 
businesses.5  In the third group, the clusters came into existence thanks to the training 
programs provided by foreign firms and international organizations.  
In cases 1 to 10, new industries emerged as a result of the shift of main products 
or activities, which would occur to take advantage the existing institutions, 
infrastructures, and technologies. 6   In Kumasi, Ghana (case 10), for example, 
metalworking firms, such as lathe turners, welders, and casting foundries, are clustered 
where thousands of car repair garages are concentrated because of the garages’ high 
demand for metal processing services and because of the abundant supply of scrap 
metal from cars that cannot be repaired.  The metalworking firms not only provide 
                                                  
5 Although printed circuit boards (PCBs) are core devices for electronics items and IT equipment, 
the PCBs produced in the clusters listed in Table 1 in their early days were technologically simple 
and produced without using expensive machinery. 
6 This is consistent with the observation of Hidalao et al. (2007) that countries move through the 
product space by developing new goods close to those they currently produce. 
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repair services but also manufacture a variety of metal products, such as corn mill 
machines, wheelbarrows, and cash safes.  Among tailors in Addis Ababa and Nairobi 
(cases 8 and 9), those who accumulated wealth and won the buyers’ trust expanded their 
businesses from tailoring into the factory production of ready-made garments.  In cases 
1, 4, 5, 7, 13, and 15, a number of entrepreneurs started as traders and then diversified 
their businesses into manufacturing.  Such former traders tend to be high-performers, 
which is likely to reflect the importance of the knowledge and skills of management and 
marketing in the operation of manufacturing firms in developing countries.  Those who 
are engaged in trading, car repairing, tailoring, and other simple production activities 
can be potential entrepreneurs in the sense that they have undertaken new 
manufacturing activities. 
     Industrial clusters in SSA face fierce international competition and other external 
pressures.  For example, garment producers have suffered from the flood of donated 
used clothing, both garment and shoe producers must compete with better-looking but 
inexpensive substitutes imported from Asia, and metalwork manufacturers have faced 
with the surging material input prices due importantly to the rising material demand in 
Asia.  Many of them, however, have survived these challenges by modifying product 
designs and by finding new marketing channels.  While the number of firms in SSA is 
unknown, it is likely that SSA has much more clusters and entrepreneurs than the 
governments and researchers recognize.7  They produce lower-quality products less 
efficiently and invest less in both physical and human resources than their counterparts 
in other regions.  One might wonder whether this is mainly due to their limited ability 
                                                  
7 We have found that the number of entrepreneurs operating in our study sites in SSA has not been 
captured by statistical and tax authorities.  We have also found a few clusters in SSA that were not 
known to researchers.   
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or, more importantly, due to bad governance, inadequate financing, and poor 
infrastructure.   
Bangladesh vs. Ethiopia 
To explore the answer to this question, it may be useful to compare the garment 
industries in Bangladesh (case 18 in Tables 1 and 2) and Ethiopia (case 8).8 Both are 
least developed countries and regarded as relatively corrupt.9  Both countries attempted 
to develop their export-oriented garment industries from scratch.  However, they have 
had contrasting outcomes.  In Bangladesh, export-oriented garment production dates 
from 1979, when a newly established firm, Desh, entered a technical cooperation 
agreement with the then leading garment exporter, Daewoo, in Korea (Rhee 1990; 
Easterly 2002).  These firms teamed up because both were sure that the creation of a 
cadre of professionals would allow the latent comparative advantage of Bangladesh in 
garment production to materialize.  The agreement sent 130 young employees of Desh, 
who were university graduates, to Korea for intensive training for eight months at 
Daewoo’s factory in production skills, management skills, and international 
procurement and marketing.  The garment industry in Bangladesh has since continued 
to grow rapidly for three decades with the continual learning of technology and 
management from abroad.  It now has more than 4,000 manufacturing firms, employs 
more than four million workers directly, and ranks among the world’s largest producers 
of garment items (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011). 
By contrast, the government of Ethiopia attached only secondary importance to 
learning from abroad when it began promoting export-oriented garment production in 
                                                  
8 See Sonobe and Otsuka (2011, chapters 8 and 9) for details. 
9 In terms of corruption, probably Bangladesh was worse, as being ranked the most corrupt country 
in the world from 2001 to 2005, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is available at 
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi> 
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the mid-2000s.  The promotion policy offered various preferential incentives including 
the provision of land in industrial zones and finance to firms that declared themselves to 
be export-oriented.  Although these firms hired highly educated managers, they had no 
experience in the operation of a garment business in the international market.  These 
firms have performed more poorly than the ready-made garment producers catering to 
the domestic market despite the preferential treatment.10 
The above comparison provides us with several lessons.  First, a labor-abundant 
country does not necessarily have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive garment 
production.  This is because the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem assumes equal access to the 
same technology, whereas comparative advantage is determined by productivity as well 
as factor endowments.  Second, a major determinant of productivity is technical and 
managerial expertise, and the best way to acquire such expertise is to learn from abroad.  
This is true not only in the Bangladesh case but also in cases 11 to 17 and 19, all of 
which are relatively successful cases.  Third, compared with the paramount importance 
of learning from abroad as a determinant of productivity, financing and corruption are 
secondary issues.  In all the cases listed in Table 1, the firms were founded with the 
entrepreneurs’ own funds or the borrowing from relatives and friends, except for the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the township-and-village-run enterprises (TVREs) 
in China.11  While there is much evidence that credit markets in developing countries 
are not working well (e.g., Beck et al., 2009; Karlan and Morduch, 2009), the fact that 
so many industrial clusters were successfully established without using formal credits 
                                                  
10 After a few years, many of the export-oriented firms received only trial orders but unable to 
receive real orders, and their labor productivity was not significantly different from that of poorly 
equipped tailors and much lower than that of the best-performing factories producing ready-made 
garments for the domestic market. 
11 In the case of private firms in China, main sources of start-up fund are own fund and borrowing 
from relative and friends (Allen et al. 2005). 
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indicates that unfavorable access to finance is not the main constraint on the 
development of industries in their initiation stage when firm sizes are small.12 
Fourth, managers and workers in the garment industry in Bangladesh know that 
returns to human capital investment are high partly because they have experiences of 
investing in their human capital and partly because the demand for skilled workers and 
knowledgeable and experienced managers is increasing as new firms are being 
established.  Thus, they are keen on learning, and their human capital investment 
drives the industry’s growth, which in turn maintains the high returns to human capital.  
Fifth, such a virtuous circle was initiated by the success of the Desh-Daewoo training 
program, which boosted the profitability of export-oriented garment production in 
Bangladesh.  The increased profitability attracted investment in new factories by 
wealthy Bangladeshi families and foreign firms, which offered worthwhile jobs to the 
intellectual youth.  Sixth, however, the Desh-Daewoo training program is difficult to 
replicate.  This is because firms are reluctant to shoulder the cost of general training 
(Becker 1962). 13   In Bangladesh, no other training program comparable to the 
Desh-Daewoo program in terms of the scale and quality has ever been provided by other 
foreign or domestic firms. 
Learning from Abroad 
It is small wonder that the value of learning from abroad is not well-recognized in 
SSA because they have not experienced the successful development of industries based 
on such learning.  Hence, the knowledge of production technologies and management 
                                                  
12 Long and Zhang (2011) find that firms provide trade credit actively to each other in industrial 
clusters in China, which lessens the credit constraints.  Ruan and Zhang (2009) find that firm size 
in industrial clusters in China is small due to the division and specialization of labor among firms, so 
that entry barrier is reduced. 
13 Desh canceled the contract with Daewoo after the training was completed and the vast majority of 
the 130 trainees soon left Desh to join new factories as managers or start their own trading houses. 
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cannot be taught on a commercial basis.  Given this market failure, the governments in 
SSA should take the initiative in setting in motion the virtuous circle described above, 
with the aid of their development partners.  A possible way of accomplishing this task 
is to vitalize technical and vocational education and training programs (TVET).  While 
TVET has so far focused on the skill formation of workers, management training 
programs should be provided for entrepreneurs and hired managers, both present and 
prospective.  The importance of managerial human capital and management practices 
to firm performance has been re-evaluated in the recent literature (e.g., Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007, 2010; Bloom et al. 2011; Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2010; Syverson 
2011).  The quality of TVET and other human resource development activities should 
be substantially improved by hiring a large number of competent foreign experts from 
newly industrialized countries as well as from developed countries.  It is also 
important to provide both general and industry-specific training.  The provision of 
various industry-specific courses corresponding to a variety of industries will help 
present and prospective entrepreneurs to select profitable industries to enter.  As is 
argued by Lin and Monga (2011), the government has to identify, at least, a set of 
potentially profitable industries consistent with the county’s comparative advantage. 
An alternative strategy is to attract FDIs to the country so that potential 
entrepreneurs can learn from them production and management knowledge.  But 
whether low-income countries can attract FDIs depends on business environments, 
which are affected by the quality of governance, business laws and regulations, the 
availability of auxiliary and supporting services, and infrastructures.  Furthermore, 
foreign firms may not invest in subsidiaries in low-income countries if they anticipate 
that their products, production methods, and marketing channels are likely to be copied 
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by native workers and their customers are likely to be stolen as in cases 11, 12, and 17.  
While we do not deny the importance of attracting FDIs, we believe that it is risky to 
rely on FDIs alone as a source of new knowledge for initiating the new industry. 
In addition, the results of international comparative study conducted by Eifert, 
Gelb, and Ramachandran (2008) indicates that firms in SSA suffer from the poor quality 
of basic infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and communication networks.  Thus, 
basic infrastructure should be provided to areas designated for industries in or near each 
major city.  Also, the central government or local governments can assist the formation 
of industrial clusters by zoning areas of land for light manufacturing.14  In so doing, 
considerable attention should be given to the prevention of fraud and corruption. 
 
III. Promotion of Market Transactions 
In cases 1 to 10 in Table 1, the pioneer of a new industry exerted great efforts to 
find new production methods, sources of materials, and marketing channels.  Once the 
new business was established, the pioneer received sizable entrepreneurial profits, 
despite the low quality of his or her products, because of the large demand for 
inexpensive products from poor domestic consumers.  This profit attracted a swarm of 
imitators to the industry.  Many of them were spin-offs, i.e., the former employees of 
the pioneer, and produced the same low-quality products by using the same low-quality 
inputs and sold their products on the same local markets as the pioneer.  In this way, an 
industrial cluster is formed, as illustrated in Figure 1.  Almost the same path was 
                                                  
14 For example, a part of the Kariobangi area in Nairobi was designated by the local government as 
an area for artisans in the late 1980s.  The skilled workers who lost jobs at large factories as a 
consequence of the Structural Adjustment Program cleared the area to construct roads and to start 
their own businesses in the area, which is now a cluster of metalwork enterprises.  See Sonobe, 
Akoten, and Otsuka (2011) for details.   
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followed by industries in which the initiation of the industry was based on the 
technology brought by FDIs, SOEs, and international organizations (cases 11 to 17 and 
19).  Since the profits were reasonably high, for the time being, entrepreneurs were not 
particularly interested in introducing new ideas and knowledge.  Hence, productivity 
and product quality hardly improved, but the cluster expanded in terms of the number of 
firms and the total output.  This phase of industrial development may be termed the 
“quantity expansion” phase.   
As a cluster expands in terms of the number of firms and their output, an 
increasing number of traders buying products and supplying materials come to the 
cluster, which makes production and transactions in the cluster more convenient.  
Moreover, some firms specialize in the production of parts.  In other words, the 
division of labor between assemblers and part-suppliers and between manufacturers and 
traders increases with the market size (Stigler 1951; Ruan and Zhang 2009).  In the 
transaction of final products and parts, transaction costs may arise from asymmetric 
information about the quality of goods to be transacted and from imperfect contract 
enforcement.  At this stage of development, however, the problem of asymmetric 
information regarding the quality is not serious because all products and parts produced 
and transacted are standard and of uniformly low quality.  The problem of imperfect 
contract enforcement is reduced by the community mechanism supported by the 
environment of the cluster in which people know each other and in which information 
regarding unscrupulous behavior can spread quickly, as in rural communities.15 
According to Marshall (1920), the advantages of industrial clusters or 
                                                  
15 Hayami (e.g., 2009) argues that the community mechanism is effective not only for the 
enforcement of contract-based transactions but also for the management of local commons and the 
provision of local public goods in rural communities.  In this paper, however, we focus on the 
enforcement of contract-based transactions. 
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agglomeration economies are: (1) information spillovers or imitation, (2) the division 
and specialization of labor among firms producing parts, components, and final 
products, and (3) the development of skilled labor markets.  While we do not have any 
objections to these advantages associated with industrial clusters, we would like to point 
out that these benefits are intimately related to each other and also to the generally low 
transaction costs in the cluster.  For example, information spillovers increase with 
spin-offs and the poaching of human resources and with transactions between firms. 
These benefits of being clustered explain at least partly why indigenously developed 
industries in developing countries are so often cluster-based.16  Huang and Bocchi 
(2008), Long and Zhang (2011), and Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), as well as many other 
studies, report that there are a large number of industrial clusters in East and South Asia 
and Latin America.  Clusters in SSA are studied by McCormick (1999) and Sonobe 
and Otsuka (2011). 
To recapitulate, the industrial cluster expands through the massive entry of 
imitators.  Although imitation is often blamed for discouraging innovation, imitation is 
socially desirable if the probability of further innovation is sufficiently small, because 
new knowledge should be disseminated as widely as possible in such a case (Arrow 
1962).  In the quantity expansion phase, no firm is attempting innovation and, hence, 
the massive entry of imitators into the cluster is socially efficient.  The expansion of 
the cluster enhances the development of the division of labor through the scale effect 
pointed out by Stigler (1952).  The formation of a cluster also facilitates the division of 
labor by reducing transaction costs. According to Parker (1984) and Mokyr (1990), 
                                                  
16 Here we distinguish between a cluster which has been established by local firms and one led by 
foreign direct investment. We believe that the community mechanism of contract enforcement plays 
an essential role in the former case, whereas the hierarchical relationships between large foreign 
firms and small local firms play a critical role in the latter case. 
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economic growth is classified into Smithian growth – growth based on the expanded 
division of labor and transactions – and Schumpeterian growth -- growth based on 
technological progress.  Cluster-based industrial development in the quantity 
expansion phase is clearly of Smithian growth.   
At this stage, a possible role of the government is to promote market transactions 
by supporting the formation of industrial clusters.  In the 1980s and 1990s, local 
governments in a large number of cities and townships in China, including our four 
study sites in China (cases 4, 5, 12, and 13 listed in Table 1), built large commercial 
premises, wherein a large number of parts-suppliers and local traders dealing in 
particular goods and services had shops.  This policy contributed to the formation of 
industrial clusters (Ding 2007; Ruan and Zhang 2009).  These governments also 
actively constructed highways and other roads and communication networks, which 
would be another major contribution to the Smithian economic growth of China. 
 
IV. Correction of Remaining and Newly Arising Market Failures 
As the entry of new firms unaccompanied by any improvement in product quality 
and productivity continues, the increased supply of their products will eventually lower 
the product prices and profitability.  This process, illustrated by Figure 1, took place in 
the subsequent period of the quantity expansion phase of industrial development in all 
cases except for case 18 listed in Table 1.  Declining profitability will induce 
entrepreneurs and managers to seek more profitable products (Aghion et al. 2005), 
which should be of higher quality and differentiated from the inferior products of other 
firms.   
Quality Improvement Phase 
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Such an endeavor, however, does not necessarily bear fruit.  While a firm may 
successfully improve product quality by using high-quality materials, consumers may 
not immediately perceive the improved quality and, hence, the new product may fail to 
command a high price in market.  Akerlof (1970) points out that branding and quality 
guarantees are effective countermeasures to this problem.  However, few entrepreneurs 
in industrial clusters in the quantity-expansion phase are familiar with such 
countermeasures.  Moreover, since brands may be stolen, branding may have to be 
supplemented with the use of exclusive sales agencies and other distribution methods 
(Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2004).  Since the improved products contain differentiated 
parts and components, and since such intermediate goods embody new ideas, it is also 
important to establish trust-based, long-term subcontracting relationships with parts 
suppliers.  In addition, to enter the high-quality segment of the market, product quality 
must be strictly controlled.  If these reforms are successfully implemented, production 
can be expanded profitably.  As the firm size is enlarged accordingly, the management 
of cash flows, inventory, and labor will assume greater importance.  Good 
management is not an easy task for entrepreneurs in the cluster, as they have operated 
only small organizations and may be unaware of how to improve management.  In this 
sense, they were far from efficient managers.  They now need to study management or 
hire competent managers or, probably, both. 
The restoration of high profitability involves these multifaceted improvements in 
production and management (IPM).  Although IPM is not a genuine innovation, the 
new IPM in a cluster is similar to innovation in the sense that it is difficult to take place.  
Moreover, it is imitated by followers.  According to our case studies, the entrepreneurs 
who achieved the first successful IPM in their clusters and those who imitated it quickly 
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tended to be highly educated. This observation is consistent with Schultz’s (1975) 
hypothesis that the ability to deal with changing profit opportunities can be enhanced by 
schooling.17  Our case studies also find that these innovative entrepreneurs took 
advantage of the availability of a variety of human resources in the cluster, such as 
traders, engineers, designers, and accountants, who gathered in the clusters in the 
quantity expansion phase.  Thus, it is fair to say that like innovation, IPM is a product 
of a new “combination” of existing resources, to use the expression of Schumpeter 
(1912). 
If an entrepreneur’s attempt to improve production and management miscarries, 
the news will be widely known quickly in the cluster, and other entrepreneurs may 
recoil from any new attempt at IPM.  This will lead the cluster to a long-run 
equilibrium with low profitability, in which firms struggle for survival (see the dotted 
curves in Figure 1).  While such “survival clusters” abound in SSA, many industrial 
clusters in Asia, including cases 1 to 5 and 11 to 14, succeeded in IPM and followed a 
path leading to the dramatic development of the industry with a smaller number of 
much larger firms, as illustrated by the solid curves in Figure 1.  The leather shoes 
industry (case 15) in Addis Ababa seems to be going through IMP by incorporating 
production and management knowledge from Italy.  The dynamic development phase 
that begins with successful IPM may be termed the “quality-improvement” phase. 
The growth of the industry in the quality-improvement phase is Schumpeterian 
growth.  An increasing number of firms attempt to imitate the first IPM in the cluster, 
and some of them further improve production and management practices.  Those firms 
                                                  
17 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010) find that education of entrepreneurs is strongly correlated 
with management score in their study on management practices across firms and countries.  
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undertaking continual IPM will grow steadily, whereas firms that fail to keep pace with 
growing firms will be forced to exit the industry or will merge with growing firms. 
While the number of firms in the cluster will decrease as the result of exits and mergers, 
the total production value and employment of the cluster will continue to grow, and the 
products will be sold in larger markets, including export markets.  Continual IPM is 
achieved by learning from outside of the cluster, especially from abroad.  More 
concretely, innovative entrepreneurs acquire new knowledge of technology and 
management by visiting foreign countries frequently to participate in trade fairs and 
training programs, sending workers abroad for training, and inviting foreign experts.  
They may also be able to learn from foreign firms operating within their countries.  
Entrepreneurs in Asia have been keen on learning from the successful experiences of 
advanced firms in neighboring countries.  Taiwan, China and Korea learned from 
Japan, whereas China learned from Taiwan,China and Korea as well as from Japan.  At 
present, South Asian countries are learning from China, among other countries.  By 
contrast, the importance of learning from abroad is not clearly recognized in SSA with 
only a few exceptions.18 
Employment Size of Industrial Clusters 
In order to illustrate how significant the industrial clusters are in terms of job 
creation and how different the sizes of industrial clusters are with and without 
successful IPM, Table 3 shows the number of manufacturing jobs and the total number 
of jobs (including those in garages in case 10 and subcontractors in case 14), as well as 
sex and schooling composition of workers in the selected industrial clusters.  Since we 
                                                  
18 Some enterprise managers in East African countries, however, are learning from other countries 
by employing technicians and managerial advisers from Asia and by visiting European countries. 
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often failed to collect the relevant job data in case studies conducted earlier, we focus on 
recently surveyed industrial clusters.  Except for cases 10, 14, 15, and 18, the clusters 
listed in this table are in the final stage of the quantity expansion phase and their 
employment size ranges from 600 to thirteen thousand and has been relatively stable for 
the last several years.  The metalwork cluster in Ghana (case 10) was expanding in 
terms of the number of enterprises at the time of our baseline survey in 2003, but it has 
been in the final stage of the quantity expansion phase probably since 2005 according to 
the results of our follow-up surveys.  The number of jobs is significantly higher in the 
knitwear cluster in Vietnam (case 14) and leather shoe cluster in Ethiopia (case 15), 
which have entered the quality improvement phase by newly introducing IPM (Sonobe 
and Otsuka 2011).    
By far the largest is the export-oriented garment industry in Bangladesh, which 
employs more than 2 million workers in 2007.  Although the development process of 
this industry has experienced several phases if one takes a closer look, it is fair to say, in 
comparison with many other industries in developing countries, that this garment 
industry experienced IPM in its earliest days (namely, around 1980) and has been in the 
quality improvement phase since then.  This is why the industry had as many as 40 
thousand workers already in 1983, just three or four years after its initiation.  Needless 
to say, the total size of jobs would be determined by a number of factors, but it seems 
clear that one of them is the success or failure of IPM.   
While monthly wages are low by international standard, they are lower in the 
garment industry than in the rolled steel, electrical fittings, and metalwork industries, 
because the latter jobs require special skills, which are often acquired by several years 
of apprenticeship.  The difference in wages between SSA and Asia is not so 
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pronounced.  The proportion of female workers is generally low and schooling levels 
of employed workers are also low even in Bangladesh, where many firms are large and 
belong to the formal sector.   
Support for Cluster Development 
In our view, efforts to improve production and management, which are almost the 
same as efforts to learn from abroad, are grossly sub-optimal in many industrial clusters, 
compared with the socially desirable level, chiefly for two reasons.  First, rampant 
imitation, which is characteristic of industrial clusters, drives a wedge between the 
social and private benefits of IPM and discourages entrepreneurs from achieving the 
socially optimal level of IPM.  Only a limited type of knowledge is protected, 
particularly in low-income countries.  Second, the value of gaining new knowledge, 
particularly acquiring managerial knowledge, is not recognized by entrepreneurs, which 
drives another wedge between the social and private benefits of IPM. 
There may be different approaches to altering the behavior and attitude of 
entrepreneurs.  For example, entrepreneurs may be given pecuniary incentives to gain 
technical and management knowledge.  Entrepreneurs, however, are likely to have no 
idea where to gain such knowledge.  Therefore, it seems better to provide a subsidized 
training program for entrepreneurs, which reduces the cost of learning including search 
costs. 19  Training programs would give rise to much more limited corruption 
opportunities than infrastructure projects (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Moreover, the 
knowledge taught in training programs will spill over from participants to 
non-participants, so that the dissemination of new knowledge is achieved without much 
                                                  
19 Reviewing various policy options to facilitate industrialization in SSA, Page (2011) concludes 
that strengthening managerial capabilities of firms and facilitating clustering are key policy 
measures.  
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cost and hence be efficient.  A model case is the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute in Taiwan, China which has facilitated the import and dissemination of foreign 
technologies by means of adaptive research and training (Hong and Gee 1993). 
We have conducted, in collaboration with the World Bank and the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), some pilot projects in which management 
training programs are provided for small entrepreneurs free of charge since 2007 in our 
study sites listed in Table 1 as cases 6, 8, 10, and 14 to 19.  We found, among other 
things, that participants had very limited knowledge of standard management practices, 
and that the majority of them were willing to learn such practices (Mano et al. 2011; 
Sonobe et al. 2011).  We randomized the selection of entrepreneurs to be invited to the 
training programs, in order to estimate the local average treatment effects of the training 
programs, whenever randomization was possible.  When it was not possible, we 
estimated the matched double-difference average treatment effects.  The estimates 
indicate clearly that the training programs have strong effects on the adoption of 
standard management practices and the willingness to pay for the admission to a similar 
training program in future, and that there are information spillovers from the training 
participants to non-participants.  Our experimental data also suggest that the training 
participants are less likely to exit the industry, even though we need longer-run 
observations to confirm this further.   
These results of the training experiments lend strong support to our arguments 
about the role that management training programs can play in promoting industrial 
development.20  However, we must emphasize that the trial training programs that we 
                                                  
20 These results are highly consistent with the results of other studies involving management 
training in developing countries (e.g., Bloom et al. 2011; Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2010; Drexler, 
Fischer, and Schoar 2010; Field, Jayachandran, and Pande 2010; Karlan and Valdivia 2011) 
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have offered are not meant to push firms remaining in the quantity-expansion phase to 
enter the quality-improvement phase.  The content of the training programs was too 
rudimentary and the training period was too short to expect such a transition to take 
place.21  Moreover, the training programs focused on management and did not include 
any aspect of technical training.  Probably, a series of training programs are needed to 
impart sufficient management knowledge for successful IPM that allow trained firms to 
transition to the quality-improvement phase.  Nonetheless, the encouraging results of 
our experiments suggest that further research is warranted on the impacts of training, the 
effective contents and design of training programs, and the way in which management 
and technology training is institutionalized and can be scaled up from a single cluster 
level to the country level. 
However, once firms get started on a continual IPM trajectory successfully, they 
will expand production, which will aggravate congestion problems, such as insufficient 
work space, noise, road congestion, and the short supply of water and electricity in their 
clusters.  In many cases, the oldest-established firms in a cluster are located in the 
center or the most congested part of the cluster.  Their founders’ highly educated 
children tend to undertake IPM earlier and more successfully than other entrepreneurs.  
These firms have stronger incentive to relocate their production bases to outside of the 
cluster, partly because of the severe congestion and partly because of the fear of 
imitation by rivals.  Thus, in order to reduce congestion and to stimulate the expansion 
of the scale of production by rigorously growing firms, the government should invest in 
industrial zones with improved infrastructures.   
                                                  
21 In general we offered classroom training for three hours per day for total of 15 days.  In addition 
we implemented on-site visits of management consultants to participating firms twice in the cases of 
training programs in Vietnam (cases 6 and 14), Ethiopia (case 16), and Tanzania (case 19). 
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In Japan; Taiwan, China; Korea; and China, the establishment of industrial zones 
mitigated the congestion problems in the existing industrial areas successfully and 
contributed to the rapid and sustained industrial growth in these countries (Levy 1991; 
Mano and Otsuka 2000; Henderson et al. 2001; Sonobe and Otsuka 2006, Chapters 2 
and 3; Otsuka 2007).  According to Solow (1956) model and the Cass (1965) model of 
economic growth, the decreasing marginal product of private capital exerts a downward 
pressure on capital formation and economic growth.  These models predict that the 
mitigation of congestion due to the shortage of public capital will enhance economic 
growth.  According to the theory of agglomeration economies (e.g., Henderson 1988; 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999), moreover, the mitigation of congestion allows the 
central areas to accommodate more innovative industrial activities, thereby contributing 
to further economic growth. 
High-performing firms in clusters in the quality-improvement phase require 
finances to move from their original industrial clusters to more spacious and 
better-equipped industrial zones.  These firms are worthy of being granted low-interest 
loans, in view of financial market failures evidenced by a host of empirical studies (e.g., 
Beck et al., 2009; Karlan and Morduch 2009).  The advantage of offering cheap credit 
to assist the industrial relocation at this stage, over the earlier stage, is that it is 
relatively easy to distinguish between innovative and, hence, promising firms and 
non-promising firms.  It is desirable to link the management training programs with 
the provision of credit and space in the industrial zone so that firms with improved 
managerial and technical capabilities and, hence, higher ability to repay loans, tend to 
receive loans and relocate their production bases.    
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V. Industrial Development without Government Failure 
In the previous section, we discussed that the provision of training programs, 
followed by the provision of adequate infrastructure and low-interest loans, which 
would address the major market failures that hinder industrial development, particularly 
the transition from the quantity-expansion phase to the quality-improvement phase.22  
However, there is always the danger that government failure outweighs market failure 
or even aggravates the market failure.  Although corruption and bribery may not be a 
part of government failure, they tend to be associated with the distortive government 
policies (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; World Bank 1997).  The question is 
whether and to what extent our recommended industrial development policy is 
compatible with the prevention of government failure. 
Our entrepreneur-led and government-assisted approach advocates the creation of 
competitive market environments by eliminating the government’s economic controls, 
regulations, and preferential treatments in favor of particular sectors.  It also 
recommends concerted efforts to combat corruption.  These efforts are needed to 
realize industrial development consistent with changing comparative advantages.  We 
also recommend investment in infrastructure in general, which is needed for the 
development of any economy but is prone to corruption.  At least, however, this is 
consistent with the current policy of most developing countries, donors, and 
international organizations.  To stimulate and accelerate the development of industries, 
we recommend management as well as technology training programs with a view to 
                                                  
22 We believe that any development strategy should specify right sequential of interventions since 
financial as well as human resources are limited, especially in low-income countries.  Big-ban 
approaches, such as the big push theory and the balanced growth theory advocated by 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Nurkse (1953), among others, and discussed more recently by Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), are likely to misfire. 
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introducing relevant new knowledge from more advanced countries.  The content of 
the training can be general including entrepreneurship, marketing methods, accounting, 
product quality control, and labor management, as well as basic and general engineering 
theories and techniques.  Whenever possible, appropriate fees should be imposed on 
training participants, which will reduce the room for corruption.23  It is important to 
increase the awareness of the importance of proper knowledge of management and 
technology through public campaigns, school education, and training programs.  If the 
true value of knowledge is widely recognized, training programs will be commercially 
offered by the private sector, i.e., a group of private firms or business consultants.24  
This does not imply, however, that solely market mechanisms can be relied upon for the 
provision of training because of the spillover effect of useful knowledge. 
To construct industrial zones and provide low-interest loans, one possibility is to 
use industrial development banks (IDBs), which are quasi-governmental organizations 
formed with the purpose of assisting new enterprises in priority industrial sectors by 
providing long-term loans and a wide range of consultancy services including technical 
and managerial advice (George and Prabhu 2000; Alsahlawi and Gardener 2004).  
There is room for IDBs to play an important role in promoting new industries in 
low-income countries, when private banks are unwilling to bear the high risks 
associated with financing new enterprises or are unable to assess the profitability of 
long-term investments in new industrial sectors due to the lack of expertise (de Aghion 
                                                  
23 Useful lessons may be learned from the use of matching grant in the technology diffusion scheme, 
in which cost is shared between participating firms and sponsoring organization and oversight is 
provided by a joint government-private supervisory committee (e.g., Biggs 1999). 
24 Indeed there are examples, in which large foreign firms offer the training programs to 
entrepreneurs.  Historically, in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries in Japan, associations 
of small producers in a number of weaving districts organized training programs to learn 
technologies from Western countries (Hashino 2009). 
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1999).25  IDBs played a positive role historically in Europe (e.g., Gerschenkron 1962) 
and in some high-performing East Asian countries (World Bank 1993).  Probably, a 
necessary condition for the successful operation of IDBs is that IDB staffs consist of 
professionals of the highest caliber with skill and expertise in long-term credit analysis.   
 IDBs are potentially subject to rent-seeking and corruption, so that loans may be 
provided to politically preferred but economically inefficient projects (La Porta et al. 
2000; Khwaja and Mian 2005).26 In order to avoid the politicians’ influence on the 
choice of loans and corruption, it is important to maintain the independence and 
autonomy of IDBs from political forces at the operational level, according to the 
Japanese experience (Okazaki and Ueda 1995). In order to strengthen monitoring of 
IDBs’ lending, it makes sense to require IDBs’ participation in co-financing with other 
financial intermediaries and international financial institutions (de Aghion 1999).  
Although granting the autonomy and requiring the co-financing would not eradicate the 
corruption and provision of credit for non-promising projects and enterprises, they are 
expected to reduce such undesirable lending behaviors.   
In sum, our recommended industrial development policy can be compatible with 
the competitive policy without entailing major government failure. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The fact that so many industries are clustered in developing countries, even 
                                                  
25 Parallel arguments are made on the rationale for the public venture capital in high income 
countries, which is supposed to support highly risky, high-tech enterprises (see, e.g., Lerner 2002). 
26 Using cross-country regressions, La Porta et al. (2000) show that the government ownership of 
banks leads to slower development of financial sector and slower growth of per capita income and 
productivity.  IDBs, however, account for a small part of the government ownership of banks, i.e., 
12.7%.  According to Khawaja and Mina (2005), government banks in general favor politically 
connected firms but those set up for SMEs and agriculture display no political bias in Pakistan.  
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though the government does not provide any support, and that there are important 
market failures in industrial clusters warrants the implementation of industrial 
development policies.  The recommended policies basically consist of the following 
four pillars: (1) a competition-oriented policy, (2) promotion of industrial clusters, (3) 
investment in managerial human capital, and (4) the construction of industrial zones and 
the provision of credit possibly through IDBs.  
In order to induce the development path consistent with changing comparative 
advantages, it is essential to build and maintain competitive market environments.  
Viewed from this perspective, the structural adjustment policies recommended by the 
World Bank and IMF can have high pay-offs in the longer run.  Also important is 
investment in social infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, water, and communication 
systems, without which no modern industries can develop.  Since it is the insightful 
and competent entrepreneurs who can identify the appropriate industries with 
comparative advantages, what the government should do is to set the correct market 
signals for them and to provide general managerial knowledge and basic infrastructures. 
The above strategy is termed the “entrepreneur-led and government-assisted” approach. 
Our presumption is that there are a number of spontaneously developed industrial 
clusters consisting of small firms in low-income countries.  Since the industrial cluster 
helps markets function by reducing transaction costs, its promotion can be included as a 
part of market competition-oriented policy.  It is also important to recognize that there 
are both dynamically growing and stagnant industrial clusters depending on whether 
multifaceted IPMs take place.  In order for such IPMs to take place, innovative 
entrepreneurs who are competent and adept at learning from abroad are needed.  
Without such entrepreneurs, the industrial clusters tend to be stagnant or even shrink 
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due to the competition with imported commodities.  In all likelihood, however, 
stagnant clusters can be activated if the introduction of appropriate management and 
technological knowledge from abroad is promoted by providing training programs for 
entrepreneurs and managers. Since IPM will be imitated, the social return to IPM 
exceeds the private return.  This is the basis to provide the support for the industrial 
cluster by providing relevant new knowledge through training programs.  Note that the 
content of such management training can be general and may be useful for 
non-clustered industries as well.   
Aside from rampant imitation, the major constraints on the further development of 
industrial clusters are congestion and the lack of credit for sizable investments.  Thus, 
we recommend the construction of industrial zones and the provision of credit.  We do 
not recommend, however, such policies before the demand for infrastructure services 
and credit has sufficiently increased due to the IPM introduced by progressive 
entrepreneurs simply because the rates of return to investments in infrastructure and 
private capital are bound to be low if there is no prior IPM.  Moreover, once IPMs take 
place, financial institutions, including IDBs, can identify promising firms more easily.   
We believe that rather than waiting for industries in low-income countries to 
develop without any assistance, the time is ripe to implement empirically supported and 
theoretically sound industrial development policies. 
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Table 1. Origin of Development of Selected Industrial Clusters in Asia and Africa 
Notes:  SMEs stand for small and medium firms.  FDIs stand for foreign direct investments. SOEs 
and TVREs stand for state-owned firms and township-village-run firms, respectively.   
Sources: Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, and 13 are from Sonobe and Otsuka (2006); 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 
and 17 are from Sonobe and Otsuka (2011); Case 10 is from Iddrisu et al. (2009); Cases 16 
and 18 are from Sonobe et al. (2010). 
 
 
 
No. Location Main product  Origin of cluster development: initial firm 
type and initial product 
1 Bingo, Japan Working clothes Farm households (traditional Japanese 
working clothes) 
2 Hamamatsu, Japan Motorcycles SMEs (woodwork, loom, car repair, musical 
instruments) 
3 Taichung, Taiwan, 
China 
Machine tool SMEs (simple machinery) 
4 Zhili, Zhejiang, China Baby clothes Farm households (silk products and 
hand-made merchandises) 
5 Wenzhou, Zhejiang, 
China 
Electrical fittings Farm households (repair parts for electrical 
fittings in SOE factories) 
6 Bac Ninh, Vietnam Rolled steel bars Farm households (agricultural implements ) 
7 Sargodha, Pakistan Electric fittings SMEs (electrical fittings) 
8 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Garment Taylors (tailored suits) 
9 Nairobi, Kenya Garment Taylors (tailored dresses) 
10 Kumasi, Ghana Metalwork SMEs (car repair) 
11 Northern Taiwan, 
China 
Printed circuit 
board 
FDIs (printed circuit boards) 
12 Chongqing, China  Motorcycles SOEs and FDIs (motorcycle) 
13 Three cities in  
Jiangsu, China 
Printed circuit 
board 
SOEs and TVREs (printed circuit boards) 
14 Hatay, Vietnam Knitwear Cooperative (knitwear for SOEs) 
15 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Leather shoes Migrant artisans (leather shoes) 
16 Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
Metalwork Migrant artisans (metal work) 
17 Nairobi, Kenya Metalwork FDIs and SOEs (metalwork) 
18 Dhaka, Bangladesh Garment Training in Korea (garment) 
19 Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
Garment UNIDO training (garment) 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-09
39 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Selected Industrial Clusters in Asia and Africa 
Notes:  
1. About 30 firms were engaged in the factory production of ready-made garments, and the rest were 
tailors with own shops at which they directly contacted with consumers. 
2. This is a rough estimate of the number of metalwork firms.  In the same cluster, there were 
thousands of garages or car repairers. 
This number includes self-employed shoe makers who were sometimes employed by other 
shoemakers. 
 
 
No. Cluster Year No. of final 
goods pro- 
ducing firms 
No. of 
workers 
per firm
Education of 
entrepreneur 
(years) 
Export markets 
1 Working clothes, Japan 1968 
1998 
200 
100 
na 
na 
10.6 
13.7 
Not exporting 
Not exporting  
2 Motorcycle, Japan 1950s
1965 
150 
3 
na 
na 
Na 
na 
Not exporting 
Worldwide  
3 Machine tools, Taiwan, 
China 
1998 100 70 13.0 Southeast Asia 
4 Baby clothes, China 1999 5000 (incl.  
subcons) 
15 7.5 Russia 
5 Elec. fittings, China  2000 200 340 10.6 Not exporting 
6 Rolled steel, Vietnam 2006 133 22.1 6.7 Not exporting 
7 Elec. fittings, Pakistan 2008 1200 10.0 9.4 Not exporting 
8 Garment, Ethiopia 2007 7001 26.1 10.1 Not exporting 
9 Garment, Kenya 2002 640 4.8 8.6 
 
Neighboring 
countries 
10 Metalwork, Ghana 2005 5002 5.9 11.0 Not exporting 
11 PCB, Taiwan, China  2000 60 930 13.2 Worldwide 
12 Motorcycle, China  2001 50 900 15.1 Southeast Asia 
13 PCB, China  2003 200 107 12.1 Not exporting 
14 Knitwear, Vietnam 2007 160 12.0 7.9 East Europe 
15 Leather shoes, Ethiopia 2005 10003 10.1 9.2 Neighboring 
countries 
16 Metalwork, Ethiopia 2008 130 72.5 10.8 Not exporting 
17 Metalwork, Kenya 2006 150 7.2 11.0 Not exporting 
18 Garment, Bangladesh 2005 4100 1231 15.0 Worldwide 
19 Garment, Tanzania 2010 700 5.0 10.7 Neighboring 
countries 
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Table 3.  The Number of Jobs, Monthly Wages, and Sex and Schooling Compositions 
of Workers in Selected Industrial Clusters 
No.1 Cluster Year No. of Man-
ufacturing 
Jobs 
(1000)  
Total 
No. of 
Jobs 
(1000)2
Monthly 
Wage 
(US$)3 
% of 
Women 
% of high 
school 
education 
and above
6 Rolled steel, Vietnam 2010 3.3 n.a. 161 5 0 
7 Elec. fittings, Pakistan 2008 13.2 n.a. 105 10 18 
8 Garment, Ethiopia 2007 7.2 n.a. 36-454 59 175 
10 Metalwork, Ghana 2003 6.7 99.26 32 0 25 
14 Knitwear, Vietnam 2010 3.2 20-307 59 70 25 
15 Leather shoes, Ethiopia 2008 22.25 n.a. 35-534 23 158 
16 Metalwork, Ethiopia 2009 9.1 n.a. 63-884 9 448 
17 Metalwork, Kenya 2008 1.2 1.7 117-2089 0 43 
18 Garment, Bangladesh 2004 2,1009 n.a. 61-9711 40 50 
19 Garment, Tanzania 2010 0.6 n.a. 57 8312 11 
Notes:  
1. The numbers are the same as in Tables 1 and 2. 
2. Including related jobs in the cluster (e.g., car repairing in the metal work cluster). 
3. Converted to US dollars by the prevailing exchange rate. 
4. The lower number refers to female wage and the higher one to male wage. 
5. The number refers to 2009. 
6. Including 80 thousand jobs generated by about 8 thousand garages. 
7. Including more than 5,000 subcontractors in nearby villages. 
8. Including those who have completed vocational training. 
9. The lower number refers to casual worker wage and the higher one to regular worker wage. 
10. The data include the employment in the country as a whole including the Greater Dhaka and 
Chittagong. 
11. The lower number refers to casual worker wage and the higher one to regular worker wage. 
12. Proportion of female owners, not workers. 
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Figure 1 An illustration of development patterns of industrial clusters in terms of 
changing profitability and the number of firms 
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